- A New Pact, a faster border: Where do fundamental rights fit?
The adoption of Regulation (EU) 2024/1348, the Asylum Procedures Regulation (APR), forming part of a comprehensive reform of migration approved by the European Parliament on 10 April 2024, adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024, through the new Pact on Migration and Asylum, represents one of the most significant reforms of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) (Conte & Yavcan, 2024). Following the adoption, civil society organisations and human rights experts raised several concerns about the compliance of the Regulation with fundamental rights, arguing that the introduction of accelerated border procedures may weaken safeguards, ultimately increasing the possibility for asylum seekers of being wrongly denied international protection (Conte & Yavcan, 2024 ).
The Regulation seeks to ensure the rapid processing of asylum applications, including through accelerated examination in the circumstances listed by Article 42, and to accelerate the return of applicants whose claims are rejected, while also establishing a specific asylum border procedure governed by Articles 43-54 (Ferrara, 2025). One of the most controversial aspects of the Regulation concerns the procedural safeguards available to asylum seekers whose applications are rejected during the procedure, eventually questioning whether protection of fundamental rights can still be ensured, as applicants are increasingly being exposed to standardised procedures and can easily face an order of return to their country.
With regard to the asylum border procedure, Article 51 establishes specific rules concerning the submission and examination of applications. In particular, APR introduced restrictive time limits compared to the regular asylum procedure. Under Article 38, the general rule is that applicants have up to 21 days from registration to lodge an application, while Article 51(1) derogates from that rule for applications subject to the border procedure and requires the application to be lodged within five days. The five-day period concerns the lodging of the application, not necessarily requiring the applicant to complete the entire evidential case within those five days. Article 51(2) then provides that each procedure must be processed as expeditiously as possible, while ensuring a fair examination which may last for a time frame ranging from 12 weeks to a maximum of 16 weeks in the circumstances specified by the Regulation (Chetail et al, 2024). This overall period covers the three different stages of the border procedure, including the examination and, if relevant, the request to remain and lodge an appeal. However, the restricted deadlines may eventually compromise the opportunity to prepare a well-articulated application, jeopardising the chances of success the person could have in appealing the return decision (Chetail et al, 2024).
Furthermore, Articles 67 and 68 establish a comparatively short deadline for lodging appeals regarding a return decision, limiting the circumstances in which such an appeal may suspend the execution of a return decision. Article 67(7)(a) requires Member States to provide a period of between five and ten days in specified circumstances, including inadmissibility or manifestly unfounded decisions. On the other hand, Article 67(7)(b) requires a period between two weeks and one month, thus raising several questions on whether applicants can exercise the rights guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR), especially in circumstances where legal assistance and the preparation of documents are required.
These provisions have attracted significant academic attention because they directly affect the effectiveness of judicial protection provided by Article 47 CFR, guaranteeing to every individual whose rights are violated access to an effective remedy before an independent judge. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has accepted short appeal periods where they are sufficient in practical terms to allow an applicant to prepare and bring an effective action and where genuine access to procedural safeguards is maintained. In Brahim Samba Diouf v Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration, the Court ruled that the 15-day limit, applied by the accelerated procedure, does not have to be considered as insufficient in terms of preparing an effective action. The stronger concern is, therefore, whether the deadlines are effective in practice, especially where access to lawyers and interpreters is difficult within the applicable period.
In light of this analysis, this article will explore whether Regulation (EU) 2024/1348, applicable since 12 June 2026, complies with the right to an effective remedy under Article 47 CFR, given the short appeal deadlines and limited automatic suspensive effect for certain “unfounded” claims.
- Judicial Protection under Regulation 2024/1348: examination of the limits of Articles 67 and 68 APR in safeguarding fundamental rights.
Article 67 of Regulation 2024/1348 represents a crucial provision, granting applicants the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal and establishing different time limits for appealing asylum decisions depending upon the type of procedure involved (Guild, 2025). Applicants must appeal both the return decision and the related decision concerning international protection where the two decisions have been adopted together, whereas separate judicial proceedings must be initiated if the decisions have been adopted separately (Guild, 2025). Article 67(3) requires a full and ex nunc examination, requiring that the facts and relevant points of law must be analysed in full, including an examination of international protection needs, creating an important safeguard for applicants. The concerns, however, remain on whether a full review of the facts and law can be carried out within such concise timeframes.
Additionally, Article 68 establishes the rules governing the right to remain on the territory of a Member State while an appeal is pending. Article 68(3) establishes that applicants do not have an automatic right to remain on the territory of a Member State if their application has been rejected as manifestly unfounded where the applicant is subject to an accelerated examination or border procedure (Guild, 2025). In those cases, Article 68(4) allows domestic courts to decide whether the applicant should be allowed to remain on the territory pending the outcome of the appeal (Guild, 2025). Finally, Article 68(5) provides protection against removal while the period for making the request is still open or while the courts are deciding on the request. While the Regulation does not always permit immediate removal, this process might create further uncertainty and procedural complexity, potentially exposing asylum seekers to violations of their rights resulting from the uncertainty of their legal position. (Guild, 2025).
The legal structure provided by these two provisions has been widely debated, with scholars pointing out that the return procedure may be exposed to systemic risks due to the speed at which proceedings are conducted, ultimately conflicting with Article 47 CFR’s structure. The newly adopted approach has been marked as increasingly promoting deterrence, containment, acceleration and externalisation, resulting in extended control at the expense of proper rights protection (Vedsted-Hansen, 2025).
The rationale underlying Articles 67 and 68 clearly promotes the acceleration of decisions on asylum applications, aiming to discourage abusive or unfounded applications, while nevertheless preserving the possibility of challenging negative decisions. However, appeal deadlines raise several questions on whether an individual, whose application has been rejected as unfounded, could realistically be able to exercise the right to appeal a decision before a court. Applicants may be unable to obtain sufficient resources and have legal assistance to properly challenge certain decisions effectively, therefore creating a significant impediment to the exercise of their procedural rights.
- The principle of effective judicial protection in the EU legal order: Does effective in Law means being effective in Practice?
The new migration framework must comply with the requirements of protection established by the 1951 Refugee Convention, providing an international framework for refugee protection, including the principle of non-refoulement; and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which forms part of EU primary law pursuant to Article 6(1) TEU, thus conferring on Article 47 CFR particular relevance for assessing the Regulation’s compatibility with EU legal obligations. It must, therefore, ensure compliance with international instruments protecting human rights and adhering to the right to an effective remedy (Nicolosi, 2024).
The analysis of the Regulation points out how these newly enacted migratory policies may conflict with the principle of effective judicial protection upon which the whole European law system was created, dating back to the European Economic Community (EEC), when the Court of Justice firstly affirmed, in 1986 in Les Verts ruling (Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v. European Parliament, 1986), that the EEC had to be considered as a “community based on the rule of law”, thereby recognising the close relationship between judicial protection and the rule of law (Nicolosi, 2024). Conferring upon individuals the right to bring legal proceedings, as Regulation 1348/2024 does, is not in itself sufficient to comply with the principle of effective judicial protection (Nicolosi, 2024). In practice, this principle can only be considered safeguarded where individuals are able to exercise the rights conferred to them, without being faced with administrative barriers hampering such exercise or making it excessively difficult (Nicolosi, 2024).
For effective judicial protection to be ensured, the system must be structured in a sufficiently clear manner, individuals must be able to challenge what they consider to be potential violations of their rights (Nicolosi, 2024). This may be proven difficult in return procedures, where individuals are not necessarily granted an adequate amount of time to construct a proper defence, and, subsequently, to be able to bring forward claims of violation of their rights (Nicolosi, 2024).
- Speed at what cost? Balancing efficiency and fundamental rights.
4.1. Five days to justice? The challenge of short appeal deadlines.
The first major issue concerns the short appeal deadlines under Article 67(7)(a). A timeframe ranging from a minimum of five days to a maximum of ten days may be insufficient, depending on the case and the applicant’s practical access to lawyers, interpretation and evidence (Guild, 2025). The main concern is whether applicants can realistically use the available period to prepare and submit an effective appeal. As a consequence of the five-day application deadline under Article 51(1), they may even be prevented from pursuing the initial request for their status to be formally recognised, as they could be faced with a short timeframe to prepare the necessary documentation and formulate a coherent case to be discussed in an interview. (Apatzidou, 2025).
Furthermore, it has been widely discussed how lawyers might refrain from offering their counsel and undertake representation of applicants within such restrictive timeframes, combined with the fact that many Member States have shown resistance to providing applicants with free legal assistance, claiming that such procedures will end up being too costly for their systems (Apatzidou, 2025). Moreover, even where legal assistance is formally available, it may prove insufficient in practice, since applicants may not receive comprehensive support throughout the procedure and may be left to manage their case after the application is lodged (Apatzidou, 2025). The acceleration of border procedures therefore affects not only applicants, who already find themselves in a vulnerable position, but also administrative authorities responsible for investigating their claims, who could face difficulties in conducting them within the prescribed timeframe.
4.2. Appeal without protection? The limits of the right to remain pending appeal.
The second major issue created by the Regulation concerns Article 68 and its potential insufficiency in ensuring an effective remedy. Here again, the short procedural deadlines are central to the debate concerning whether the new approach can be considered compatible with European legal standards (Apatzidou, 2025). Article 68 does not abolish the right to remain pending appeal; rather, Article 68(2) establishes a general right to remain until the time limit for bringing a first-instance appeal expires. However, Article 68(1)(2) provides for a suspensive effect of the decision in specified circumstances; applicants might be removed from a Member State while still waiting for the final decision, and be wrongly returned to their country of origin before they even had the possibility to present their case effectively (Apatzidou, 2025).
Article 68(3) creates numerous exceptions, including decisions rejecting applications as unfounded where the applicant is subject to an accelerated examination or border procedure. Article 68(4) provides a significant judicial safeguard, conferring on courts the authority to decide whether an applicant may remain on the territory of the Member State. For judicial protection to be effective, an applicant should be able to be protected by courts before being subjected to an irreversible consequence, such as a removal decision, prohibited by Article 19(2) CFR in cases where the concerned person may be subjected to serious violations, such as being subjected to torture or degrading treatment. If an applicant is unjustly returned to his country of origin, a subsequent finding that a decision may have been taken on the wrong grounds will have limited, if any, beneficial consequences for the concerned person.
An examination of the Regulation, particularly in light of the shortened deadlines and the exceptions to the right to remain, reveals the possibility of the creation of administrative barriers to the right to an effective remedy. The right to appeal within an appropriate timeframe, allowing the applicant to gather the necessary documents and present them to a lawyer, who can consequently construct a comprehensive defence, constitutes a necessary element of the principle of non-refoulement. The shortened appeal deadlines will inevitably have, as a consequence, the creation of multiple administrative barriers rather than ensuring that the requests are being processed both quickly and fairly (Guild, 2025). Accordingly, while the Regulation appears to formally preserve the right to an effective remedy and comply with fundamental rights protection, the operational measures may compromise the effective enjoyment of fundamental rights (Guild, 2025).
- Conclusion: When justice comes too late.
Regulation 2024/1348 and the newly enacted migration framework are a clear consequence of the growing need among national and European legislators to ensure the protection and integrity of the Union’s external borders. A well-functioning administration is particularly relevant in the field of migration and asylum, as a result of the consequences that a mistake in this field may lead to and the vulnerable position many applicants find themselves in. Inadequate safeguards may increase the risk of erroneous decisions with irreversible consequences, especially for those who might be wrongly subjected to a removal decision without the possibility to comprehensively appeal it.
Therefore, the compatibility of Articles 67 and 68 with Article 47 CFR might still be unclear, particularly when taking into account that the services, such as legal assistance and interpretation, offered to asylum seekers are often scarce, leading to difficulty in obtaining timely assistance. In conclusion, although the formulation of Articles 67 and 68 demonstrates an intention on the part of the EU legislature to preserve procedural safeguards, upon which the entire system was built, the practical effectiveness seems to remain dubious, ultimately handing the matter to future litigation before the CJEU, which ought to play a decisive role in interpreting the Regulation.
Bibliography.
Apatzidou, V. (2025). Bordering asylum: Examining the EU’s border
Brahim Samba Diouf v. Ministre du Travail, de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration, C-69/10 (Court of Justice of the European Union July 28, 2011). EU:C:2011:524
Chetail, V., & Ferolla Vallandro do Valle, M. (2024). The Asylum Procedure Regulation and the Erosion of Refugee’s Rights. EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy Blog, 23.
Conte, C., & Yavcan, B. (2024). Reflection paper on the new EU pact on migration and asylum. Migration Policy Group, 27.
European Parliament & Council of the European Union. (2024). Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU*. Official Journal of the European Union, L 2024/1348.
European Union. (2012). *Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012/C 326/02. Official Journal of the European Union.
Ferrara, R. (2025). When numbers lie: the limits of the 20% rule in the EU Asylum Procedures Regulation. European Law Blog.
Guild, E. (2025). The EU’s new asylum pact and Ireland’s opt-in. European Journal of Migration and Law, 27(1), 41-65.
Nicolosi, S. F. (2024). Addressing a crisis through law: EU emergency legislation and its limits in the field of asylum. Utrecht Law Review, 17(4).
Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v. European Parliament (1986) Case 294/83, [1986] ECR 1339, ECLI:EU:C:1986:166.
Vedsted-Hansen, J. (2025). European governance of deterrence and containment. A legal perspective on novelties in European and Danish asylum policy. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 51(8), 2015–2032.
