The scale of civilian suffering consequently after the January attacks exceeded any concrete military advantage, making the attacks a violation of the proportionality principle under humanitarian law.
A cold welcome to 2026
For some, the year 2026 came with hope, yet for some, it came with chaos and uncertainty. While many were just starting the new year, the US was already launching attacks in Venezuela, peace negotiations were emerging between Cambodia and Thailand, and the Ukrainian-Russian war was still ongoing. January 2026 marked one of the coldest winters in recent years in Ukraine, yet this did not stop Russian troops from ceasing or slowing down their military operations. In Kyiv, two combined heat and power plants were targeted, not once, but repeatedly within the same month, by Russian missiles, leaving more than 1000 tower blocks with disrupted heat and electricity, and with authorities unable to cover the casualties before spring. At least 161 civilians died because of the attack, and over 700 were injured during this month. Not only were civilians’ homes affected, but schools, hospitals, and other facilities were also disrupted, on days in which temperatures would reach even minus 20 degrees. “When power, heating, and water are repeatedly knocked out in the dead of winter,” the head of United Nations Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) noted, “basic survival becomes a daily struggle.”
A deliberate strategic campaign
Russia’s targeting campaign did not only aim at Ukrainian military objectives, but also to deliberately undermine Ukraine’s citizens’ ability to conduct a normal life, using cold and darkness as political pressure weapons in Ukraine. While Dimitry Peskov stated that the military strikes aimed at targets that “are associated with the military complex of the Kyiv regime”, the evidence of destruction showed that the attacks in fact affected purely residential areas and protected facilities (hospitals and schools). Thus, the operational objective shifted from destroying individual precise targets to degrading the functionality of an entire infrastructure that is also essential for the lives of all of Ukraine’s population, not only the military forces. Disruptions to electricity and power facilities also affect heating, communications, and medical services, effectively disabling life-support services. And all of this unfolded during one of the coldest winters in Ukraine. While the attacks from Russian forces on Ukrainian energy infrastructure are not a new topic, but rather a recurrent scenario since the war started in 2022, this is the latest and most drastic one. Whether this constitutes a carefully calculated military and strategic operation, or an accumulation of deliberate choices and circumstances, is a question that law helps answer in the following section.
What international (humanitarian) law says
Under international humanitarian law (IHL), and more specifically Additional Protocol I (AP I) and the Geneva Conventions (GC I-IV) – both ratified by Ukraine and Russia – the rules from these instruments are particularly relevant when unravelling this incident. As a general principle in IHL, parties to an armed conflict must at all times distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects, as well as between combatants and civilians. As such, under Art. 52 of AP I, attacks may be directed only at objects which, by their nature, location, purpose, or use, make an effective contribution to military action. The balancing factor in this equation would be military necessity. Under the principle of proportionality, equally important in humanitarian law, the military advantage anticipated from an operation must be weighed against the expected civilian harm. Attacks that cause excessive civilian harm in relation to the anticipated direct military advantage are strictly prohibited. Further, under Art. 54 of AP I, attacks against objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population are also prohibited.
However, in some circumstances, objects such as power grids may qualify as dual-use, serving both civilian and military purposes. Then, the debate and analysis are more complicated, as there needs to be proof of whether the objects are used exclusively for the aid of the military forces or for the civilian population. Nonetheless, the Ukrainian scenario proves very hard for the Russian narrative that the power grids were a military objective. Given that the attacks have not been proven to directly target supply facilities serving the Ukrainian military, but have instead cut electricity, water, and heat to residential areas, leaving hundreds of people at the mercy of a severe and cold winter, it is impossible to prove the military necessity. The scale of civilian suffering did exceed any concrete identified military advantage, making the attack in violation of the proportionality principle explained before. The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission (UNHRMM) has concluded there are reasonable grounds to believe that multiple aspects of Russia’s recent energy campaign have violated foundational principles of IHL. But even then, the question remains: who should enforce the IHL, when the warring party is not willing to comply?
Conclusions
Yet, why does IHL matter so much in this case? While IHL does not concern itself with the causes of a conflict, nor with who started it, its focus is on who is protected during a conflict, and what limits bind those who wage it. So, what happened in January 2026 is not only a military operation that exceeded proportionality, disguised as a ‘legitimate’ military aim, but was also the start of longer-term consequences and disruptions in civilian lives. Bottom line: power grids, heating plants, and water systems are not military targets when used for the civilian population. But when they are destroyed in winter, they function as weapons against this very civilian population they were built to serve.
So, while we may have many legal instruments governing what happens during wars, in this concrete case, what sits between the law and what is happening on the field depends on the political will. A lock only works if a hand is willing to turn the key. Therefore, uncertainty does not come from what the law says, but from whether it will be enforced.