On 16 December 2025, Regulation 2025/2643 establishing the European Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products, or “EDIP regulation” was signed. Amidst a sea of EU legislation designed to foster communal defence procurement between EU Member States (MS) does this relatively new legal toolbox have what it takes to effectively address supranational defence procurement and supply-chain concerns, and which results have been delivered nearly one year after entry into force?
The EDIP Regulation establishes the first dedicated EU programme and integrated legal framework aimed at strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). It comprises a budget of €1.5 billion for 2025-2027, including €300 million allocated to the Ukrainian DTIB. (Art. 3 Regulation 2025/2643).
Financed through the Union budget, EDIP complements and implements elements of the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS), presented by the Commission and the High Representative in March 2024 (Szabolcs, 2025, p. 27). The regulation builds on the lessons learnt from the expired European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) and Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) (Szabolcs, 2025, p.27). Article 1 sets forth the establishment of:
- the EDIP “Programme”, composed of measures strengthening the EDTIB’s competitiveness, responsiveness and ability (Chapter II)
- the cooperation programme “Ukraine Support Instrument” to recover, reconstruct and modernize the Ukrainian DTIB, with a view towards integrating it into the broader European DTIB (Chapter III)
- a legal framework for European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCI) (Chapter IV)
- a European Military Sales Mechanism (EMSM) (Chapter V)
- a legal framework for Structures for European Armament Programmes (SEAP) (Chapter VI)
- the Defence Security of Supply Board (DSSB) within a legal framework ensuring the security of supply and overseeing the internal market for defence products (Chapter VII)
The EDIP Programme
Article 4 of the EDIP Regulation sets out measures to support the competitiveness, resilience and readiness of the EDTIB.
Common procurement actions are to be carried out either by at least three contracting authorities from at least three Member States or associated countries, of which at least two must be contracting authorities from different Member States, or by a SEAP (Art. 11(2)–(3). The Commission may also act as a central purchasing body (Art. 15), expediting delivery (Art. 15(7)), concluding advance purchasing agreements (Art. 16) or assisting in ramp-up measures (Art. 17).
Other measures also include “industrial reinforcement actions” (Art. 12) or “supporting actions” (Art. 13). The former relates to accelerating defence production, the establishing of industrial partnerships, and infrastructure measures, and the latter to considerations of market access, interoperability and cross-certification, as well as the adapting of civilian products for defence applications.
For such actions, the estimated cost of components originating outside of the Union and associated countries may not exceed 35% (Art. 10(3), (4)).
Defence companies may receive a wide range of funding rates, from 15% for common procurement actions (Art. 20 (4)) up to 100% for certain supporting actions (Art. 20 (1)). These measures are bolstered by the Fund Accelerating Defence Supply Chains Transformation (FAST) which provides SMEs and small mid-caps with equity or debt support (Art. 14). SMEs and small mid-caps can thus accelerate investment in defence research, security of supply, and production while reducing investment risk (CMS Law, 2025).
Ukraine Support Instrument
With a separately allocated €300 million (Art. 3(2)(a)), the USI establishes a dedicated framework for Ukraine’s participation in EDIP. Ukraine may fully participate in joint procurement (Art. 28), ramp-up agreements (Art. 30), advance-purchasing agreements (Art. 29), enjoying up to 100% funding for industrial reinforcement and supporting actions (Art. 33 (1)), and 25% for actions of common procurement (Art. 33 (4)).
European Defence Projects of Common Interest
With a view towards reinforcing EDTIB competitiveness through improved interoperability, increased market integration and reduced strategic dependencies, EDPCIs are large-scale collaborative industry projects which the Council has identified on proposal by the Commission as being strategically important for Union defence and security across all domains (Art. 35 (1)). Up to 100% funding may be covered for EDPCIs. Notably, EDPCIs must take into consideration any efforts by MS in frameworks such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the EDA or NATO (Art. 35 (2)).
European Military Sales Mechanism
The European Military Sales Mechanism is a two-track instrument with the goal of strengthening the competitiveness of the EDTIB and Ukrainian DTIB (Art. 36 (1)). Established by the Commission and under consultation by the EDA, the first track consists of the European Military Sales Catalogue. The Commission is to keep a single, up-to-date catalogue of defence products produced by the EDTIB as well as the Ukrainian counterpart (Art. 37).
The second track provides for the possibility of MS, SEAPs, associated countries and Ukraine to establish Defence Industrial Readiness Pools (DIRP) (Art. 38). These are made up of defence products which MS, associated countries and Ukraine could easily purchase or use, to strengthen the respective DTIBs (Rec. 49). The idea behind these pools is to safeguard a secure supply of defence products by improving product availability and reducing delivery times (Rec. 49).
Structure For European Armament Programme
SEAPs are a novel addition to joint procurement procedures between MS. Possessing their own legal personality, (Art. 43(1)) SEAPs provide for an all-inclusive framework to pool development, procurement and life-cycle management efforts, fostering cross-border industrial cooperation (Art. 40(1). Specific SEAPs may be established to manage and maintain specific DIRPs by facilitating common procurement and supporting actions (Art. 38 (4) a, b). SEAP members can include MS, associated countries and Ukraine (Art. 44(1)). SEAPs may also cooperate with non-associated countries, provided such cooperation does not contravene security and defence interests of the Union and its MS (Art. 44(4)). Certain defence products included within SEAPs may qualify for VAT exemptions (Art. 45(1)c).
Security of Supply and the Defence Security of Supply Board
The EDIP regulation further provides for a security of supply regime. In crisis situations as defined in Article 1(10) of Directive 2009/81/EC, existing framework agreements for procurement may be modified to allow for new contracting authorities to participate, or to increase order quantity up to 100% of the initial value (Art. 52).
In other cases relating to Directive 2009/81/EC, MS contracting authorities may also dispense awards directly without first issuing a call for tenders (Art. 53). Other measures include the acceleration of permit-granting for crisis-relevant products (Art. 54), and an expedited cross-certification process between MS (Art. 55).
To provide a holistic security of supply regime, the mapping of defence supply chains is crucial. Identifying manufacturing capacities, defence product supply chains, possible bottlenecks and early-warning factors for the security of supply regime help to determine a supply-chain’s strengths and weaknesses (Art. 56). Continuous monitoring of crisis-relevant products (Art. 57), stress-testing supply-chains (Art. 58), and a dedicated mechanism to respond to risks of supply chain disruptions (Art. 59) assist in this effort.
These activities are carried out primarily by the Commission, with the Defence Security of Supply Board. The DSSB, being composed of representatives from all MS, the Commission, as well as the High Representative and the EDA (Art. 76 (5)), facilitates such measures by providing recommendations to the Commission (Art. 76 (2)).
Where serious disruptions or the imminent risk of such are detected in the provision of non-defence crisis-relevant products, or where such disruptions may severely impact the internal market, a supply-crisis state may be activated (Art. 60).
In such states, the Commission may request information from economic operators (Art. 62, and even request operators to prioritize certain orders of non-defence, crisis-relevant products (Art. 63 (2)). Where the operator denies this request, the Commission may, in due accordance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, adopt an implementing act forcing the operator to comply (Art. 63 (9)).
Articles 64 to 66 mirror Article 60 to 63 but differ in the type of crisis-state. These security-related supply-crisis states address disruptions or the imminent risk of disruptions in the provision of defence products, or such disruptions severely impacting the functioning of the internal market (Art. 64). The Commission may again raise information requests or prioritize defence products by request, which the operator is free to refuse (Art. 65). If the operator accepts the Commission’s request, it shall be released from any contractual liability based on MS law (Art. 66).
To further ensure the security of supply of crisis-relevant defence products, the Council can provide for MS to process intra-EU transfer of such products efficiently and timely, at least within two weeks (Art. 67).
The Council may also support emergency defence innovation actions, aiming to shorten delivery times, simplify a defence products technical specifications and production process, or replace components with more available alternatives within the Union (Art. 68).
Where an economic operator does not comply with information requests or prioritization requests, the Commission may impose penalties and fines upon the operator (Art. 72).
Additional measures ensuring rapid certification procedures may also be undertaken by the Council (Art. 69, 70).
EDIP’s Accomplishments
At the time of its entry into force, the EDIP regulation served the unique and important role of bridging the gap in EU procurement between long-term legal structures and short-term emergency measures, such as ASAP (Szabolcs, 2025, p.27). Now, the first results are in: for 2026, over €168 million have been awarded through industrial reinforcement actions alone, building on the success of ASAP (European Commission, 2026). The first five EDPCIs have also been identified following an implementing decision by the Council on 28 September 2026, freeing up €325 million from the EDIP budget to be spent on the following critical domains (European Commission, 2026):
- Drones and counter-drone systems
- Maritime and seabed defence
- Space
- Air and missile defence
- Strengthening security along the EU’s eastern flank
For common procurement, the first round of calls receiving up to €20 million per project closed this October, with a second round beginning in February 2027 (European Commission, 2026).
Preparations for the distribution of €100 million through the FAST mechanism are ongoing, following a round of applications in Q2/Q3 of 2026 (European Commission, 2026).
The USI is still in the process of receiving calls, allocating €82 million for unmanned systems and counter-unmanned systems projects, although the final availability of this budget is contingent on the overall 2027 budget being approved by the EU budgetary authority (European Commission, 2026).
Analysis
It could be argued that EDIP falls short in terms of sheer economic impact. Compared to the broader SAFE (Security Action For Europe) instrument which allocates €150 billion in long-maturity loans to MS for their own procurement programmes (European Commission, 2026), or the €90 billion from the Ukraine Support Loan (UASL) (European Commission, 2026), EDIP stands out as being remarkably weak in its financial resources. However, the size of its budget should not be reason to dismiss the regulation’s potential (Marrone & Murgia, 2026). EDIP has already created a strong, clear architecture for strengthening the common European DTIB. It simplifies and promotes joint procurement and innovative investments into SMEs and mid-caps through various funding mechanisms, without neglecting the Ukrainian DTIB, and seeks to further its integration into its European counterpart. The next Mulitannual Financial Framework 2028-2034 foresees €131 billion in funding for defence and space. To capture the full effectiveness of this budgetary allocation, the European legislator needs to utilise the toolkit established by EDIP at scale (Marrone & Murgia, 2026).
Conclusion
Not only should EDIP be viewed as complementary to other tools such as SAFE or UASL, but it must also be understood as laying the foundation for future, post-2028 instruments (Marrone & Murgia, 2026). Instruments such as EDPCIs and SEAPs have laid out a legal scaffolding which can transform the successes realised by EDIP today, into common European wins tomorrow.
Bibliography:
CMS Law (2025). EDIP Regulation: A New European Framework for Defence Industrial Sovereignty
European Commission (2026). EDIP Industrial Reinforcement Actions 2026 call results
European Commission (2026). European Defence Industry Programme | EDIP Forging Europe’s Defence
European Commission (2026). SAFE | Security Action For Europe
