North America15 November 202613 min read

Implications of Quantum Magnetometry and Anti-Submarine Warfare for US Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrence

How perceptions of novel technological capabilities shape the future of strategic stability

Submarine
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Key Insights

This strategic advantage provided by stealth platforms at sea appears to be in peril as improvements in quantum sensing lie ahead, threatening to offset it by making the ocean “more transparent”.

The late 20th century witnessed the advent of the second quantum revolution, also referred as Quantum 2.0, still ongoing today. It strives to actively manipulate the behaviour of individual quantum systems, such as atoms, ions, photons, to bring in novel applications, branching out into quantum computing, quantum communication and quantum sensing. This approach far exceeds the scope of the first quantum revolution which, instead, was restricted to observing and exploiting quantum properties of matter without controlling them directly (Peyyala et al., 2026, p. 1-2).

Due to the dual-use nature of quantum technologies, they can serve both civilian and military purposes. Notably, the Defense Science Board of the US Department of War (DoW) defined quantum sensing as “the most mature military application of quantum technologies” and as being “poised for mission use” (Sayler, 2026). However, quantum sensing does not form a homogenous block but encapsulates different modalities, whose Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) highly differ from one another (Patsnap, 2026).

Among the quantum sensors, quantum magnetometry has drawn attention for its implications on anti-submarine warfare (ASW). It constitutes one of the four primary lines of effort of the Project Farseer, recently launched by the US DoW’s Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), an initiative conceived to plug the gaps in Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) via quantum sensing (US Department of War [DoW], 2026). Although their defence applications are mostly still confined to laboratory prototypes, some researchers estimate that their future operational deployment will put a strain on the long-held assumption of undetectability ascribed to second-strike retaliatory forces (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research [UNIDIR], 2026).

To explore this possibility, the article engages in a qualitative literature review of academic research and government publications, narrowing down the focus to quantum-enabled detection in the maritime domain, without seeking to determine the full range of military applications provided by quantum technologies. More specifically, this study breaks down into three main sections: the first one briefly elaborates on the US undersea strategic deterrence; the second one investigates to what extent advances in quantum magnetometry could undermine the survivability of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), namely the sea-based leg of the US nuclear triad; lastly, the third section endeavours to assess the impact of changing policymakers’ perceptions and expectations on crisis stability.

On the basis of publicly available evidence, the rollout of quantum magnetometry for defence purposes is unlikely to abruptly do away with stealth platforms in the short term. Its strategic significance may nevertheless precede its demonstrated technical performance: perceptions that the historical near-invulnerability of stealth submarines could become less reliable may challenge the theory of mutually assured destruction (Kaiser, 2026), as confidence in survivability under a worst-case scenario is key to the credibility of nuclear deterrence (Galileo, 2026). That being said, geopolitical ambitions pursued by states will be ultimately decisive in determining whether quantum sensing holds a destabilising or a stabilising effect on nuclear deterrence (UNIDIR, 2026).

1. US Nuclear Posture and Undersea Deterrence

Against the backdrop of emerging threats looming over a deteriorating multipolar security environment, the post-Cold War chapter of US nuclear policy seems to be drawing to a close and with it, the cooperative framework that marked this period.

The year 1991 ushered in what the US President at the time George H. W. Bush termed as the “new world order.” The signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) on 1 July 1991, followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union on 8 December of the same year, paved the way for an era imbued with optimism. In accordance with the START I, the United States and the newly named Russian Federation embarked on a process aimed at scaling down their nuclear stockpiles while strengthening conventional capabilities, in a bid to avert risks of nuclear confrontation and rein in the arms race (Roberts, 2024, p. 8-9).

At the end of the 2010s, the geopolitical context has undergone a change of course, bringing back the great power rivalry to the forefront. “The Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge” marks a paradigm shift in the US security agenda, claiming that “inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security” (U.S. Department of Defense [DoD], 2018, p. 1). The dialogue and partnerships that had characterised the US approach for strategic stability in the post-Cold War era have given way to strategic competition, designating Russia and China as chief priorities of the US nuclear deterrence (U.S. DoD, 2018, p. 4).

Over time, the United States has rolled out programmes aimed at modernising its arsenal of nuclear weapon delivery systems, which make up the three legs of the “American nuclear triad,” ranging from land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and long-range bombers to SSBNs. Most importantly, it is in these latter that the US Department of War identifies “the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad,” whose near-invulnerability rests on their low-observable design, increased range and pinpoint accuracy (DoW, n.d.). As second-strike assets, the SSBNs form the backbone of the US sea-based nuclear deterrence designed to discourage adversaries from undertaking a pre-emptive nuclear attack. More specifically, the deterrence theory, grounded in the notion of mutually assured destruction, posits that in the event of a nuclear strike a sufficient number of submerged vessels would survive to retaliate by inflicting massive damage on the aggressor (Kroenig, 2021, p. 59).

Nevertheless, this strategic advantage provided by stealth platforms at sea appears to be in peril as improvements in quantum sensing lie ahead, threatening to offset it by making the ocean “more transparent.” In other words, were this frontier technology to be fielded, it would enhance ASW capabilities (Kubiak, 2020, p. 5) gradually sinking into a post-stealth era (Matisek et al., 2025).

2. Quantum Sensing-Nuclear Nexus

Labelled as “the most mature military application of quantum technologies” by the Defense Science Board of the US DoW (Sayler, 2026), quantum sensing lends itself well to revamp ISR, enhancing battlefield awareness. It operates by harnessing quantum phenomena to measure physical quantities, such as gravity, light, temperature, magnetic and electromagnetic fields, and so forth, potentially outperforming classical sensors in terms of sensitivity and precision (Schmit et al., 2026, p. 1-2). Here, detection relies upon intrinsic properties of the target without giving off external signals, thereby making quantum sensing technologies able to spot minute anomalies, while slipping past radars (Krelina, 2025, p. 12).

As great powers increasingly resort to electronic warfare to disrupt adversaries’ communication and navigation, this passive approach provides resilience against jamming or spoofing attacks, prompting Washington to scale up investment in quantum sensing. Notably, on 24 June 2026 the DIU disclosed the Project Farseer, an investment programme set up to foster and accelerate the integration of quantum sensing and timing hardware into the Joint Force, so as to move from the lab to operational deployment in a compressed timeline. For this purpose, Farseer endeavours to craft a solution to the so-called “sensitivity-SWaP trade-off,” whereby the required degree of sensor sensitivity must be balanced against constraints stemming from size, weight and power consumption, while also accounting for cost-effectiveness (Bhardwaj, 2026).

Among the pivots around which Farseer revolves, quantum magnetometry features prominently (Bhardwaj, 2026). Holding out the promise to make up for shortcomings in conventional magnetic anomaly detection (MAD), quantum magnetometers like superconducting quantum interference devices (SQUIDs) or nitrogen-vacancy (NV) centres in diamonds are remarkably sensitive to femtotesla-scale disturbances in terrestrial magnetic fields (QNu Labs, 2026). 

On one hand, by leveraging their ultra-sensitivity, SQUIDs can potentially cover a radius of about 6 kilometres compared to the few hundred metres reachable by classical magnetometers (Krelina, 2021, p. 38). However, this hyper-responsiveness to subtle stimuli can also backfire as it renders quantum magnetometers vulnerable to environmental noise, mechanical vibration and temperature swings as well, all of which could interfere with accurate measurements amid military operations (Bhardwaj, 2026). Although we should never forget that, the impacts of these external factors may be mitigated by NV-diamond sensing. In contrast to SQUIDs, which are encumbered with cryogenics for refrigeration, NV-centre diamond sensors are light-weight platforms that can be easily mounted on small distributed sensing infrastructures as they operate at room temperature. Moreover, the rugged material of their core helps them avoid vibration and thermal shocks. The combination of these properties explains why the NV-diamond sensing stands out as the most promising quantum magnetometer to cross the “innovation valley of death” and revolutionise MAD (Sharp, 2026). 

The ability of stealth submarines to elude detection by concealing in the deep ocean lies precisely in the minimisation of their multi-influence signature, which breaks down into five types of radiation: acoustic, magnetic, electric, pressure and seismic (García et al., 2026, p. 68). Therefore, the quantum-enabled detection of the magnetic signature generated by SSBNs could jeopardise their survivability along with the US sea-based nuclear deterrence, which is premised on the assured second-strike capability (Hassan, 2025, p. 3). Yet, the detection of strategic assets does not automatically translate into tracking. To put it differently, identifying the source of the detected signals and pinpointing its exact location require the huge volume of data gathered to be stored, processed, analysed and interpreted. That is why quantum sensing is unlikely to become a game changer in the short term; instead, it must be regarded as a force multiplier that augments legacy military capabilities (Matisek et al., 2025). According to Dr. Antonio Bhardwaj (2026), for quantum sensing to reach its full potential, it must be paired with AI-driven analysis systems capable of transforming raw data into actionable intelligence, adding a further layer of technological complexity to its rollout.

3. Stability is a Matter of Strategic Calculus

The end of stealth is not around the corner because the opacity typical of the maritime domain is on the verge of fading away. On the contrary, the hurdles of the operational deployment of quantum sensing so far, keep sticking around. What is changing are solely the expectations about the survivability of second-strike retaliatory forces underpinning the strategic stability that steer decision-making (Kaiser, 2026).

The US political scientist Matthew Kroenig (2021) points out that the geopolitical ambitions pursued by great powers play a crucial role when it comes to weighing up the disruptive potential of emerging technologies (Kroenig, 2021, p. 60). Notably, geopolitics and dual-use technologies are deeply intertwined as the objectives of the former tend to galvanise the evolution of the latter, which, in turn, becomes a major driver of power. Status-quo states may perceive the pursuit of technological-military advantages by Moscow and Beijing as a potential threat to either US and its Allies national security or to the existing balance of power (Kroenig, 2021, p. 66). This dynamic is exemplified by Robert Jervis’ security dilemma, whereby “many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others” (Jervis, 1978, p. 169). According to Jervis, technology can act as an amplifier of this dilemma that plagues international politics (Jervis, 1978, p. 2012), further compounded by the opacity surrounding adversaries’ intentions and capabilities (Bhardwaj, 2026).

While the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) contributes to a certain degree of transparency over nuclear powers’ warheads in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), states’ quantum posture is not subject to scrutiny by international organisations (Bhardwaj, 2026). The advent of the Quantum 2.0 brings with it dual-use technologies, whose functioning and performance leveraged by adversaries are not easily assessable. The security dilemma arising out of this secrecy over civil versus military applications risks leading to miscalculations that spark crisis instability well before technological maturity is reached, driven by perceived vulnerabilities whose impact can be just as destabilising as real ones (Galileo, 2026). This happens because nuclear deterrence has historically hinged on assumptions of survivability rooted in the cloaking ability of SSBNs, but headways in submarine detection are chipping away at confidence in their low-observability, debunking the unchangeable status ascribed to opaqueness in the maritime domain. Although quantum magnetometers are far from attaining the objective of making oceans more see-through, the risk of pre-emption under uncertainty does not spring from real-world perfect targeting; instead, it is inflated by speculations over adversaries’ improvements in detection capability that strain the second-strike retaliatory forces (Kaiser, 2026).

In this respect, Ariel (Phantitra) Phuphaphantakarn (2026), a Policy Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN), conceptualises states’ fear of falling behind in the strategic competition as “Quantum Anxiety”, warning that the resulting risk of miscalculation may spiral into a conventional confrontation or even a nuclear escalation. In other words, as the ambivalent nature of quantum technologies shapes threat perception and informs national security agendas, a state’s decision to increase investment in the development of ASW capabilities could be interpreted as an attempt to acquire a strategic advantage at the expense of their own security. This, in turn, could prompt them to pursue comparable capabilities, triggering a vicious cycles whereby the one state’s technological progress is perceived as a threat to another’s national security (Phuphaphantakarn, 2026). This strategy, consisting in hedging against “technological surprise”, translates into an interplay between measures and countermeasures aimed at gaining or neutralising a strategic edge and it is captured by what the research scholar Lindsay Rand refers to as an “action-reaction cycle” (Rand, 2024, p. 11-12). In her socio-technical analysis, Rand sheds light on how social factors contribute to fostering exaggerated narratives about the disruptive potential of quantum sensing. She further argues that the drivers of innovation extend beyond technical and strategic consideration; power dynamics, decision-makers and their interests in securing R&D funding can generate self-reinforcing incentives for quantum sensing development, potentially amplifying overly optimistic perceptions of its applicability (Rand, 2024, p. 13).

4. Conclusion

The findings of this study demonstrate that, as fielded-deployable quantum magnetometers reach commercial readiness, the pool of underwater undetectable assets threatens to dry up. Therefore, any nation which secures an edge in these state-of-the-art technologies, not only will gain the upper hand in the scramble for quantum technologies, but will also erode the unknowability of its opponents’ SSBNs, compelling national defence planners to revise the foundations of their nuclear deterrence and posture in the long run. Also, even before the operational threshold is crossed, the strategic relevance of quantum magnetometry as a tool for ASW may come to the fore, because uncertainty over whether the barriers have been broken down to their full deployment can itself manipulate perceptions of survivability. However, this estimation does not entail that invisible weapon systems will be phased out of US military doctrine overnight. On the contrary, they are highly likely to remain at the heart of the US sea-based nuclear deterrence, notwithstanding the faltering credibility of the stealth coatings. This unreliability will put a crimp in the ability of nuclear second-strike forces to thwart pre-emptive attacks, thereby dealing a serious blow to crisis stability premised on mutually assured destruction.

References

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Sara Russo Sara Russo is a second-year MA student in Relations and Institutions of Asia and Africa, with a research focus on geopolitical transformations and emerging global challenges. Her interests span technological innovation and strategic competition, with particular attention to cybersecurity and the safeguard of space-based infrastructures. She explores how interactions, interdependencies and evolving relationships among international actors shape the dynamics of global security and governance.

Cite this brief
Russo, S. (2026). Implications of Quantum Magnetometry and Anti-Submarine Warfare for US Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrence. EPIS Insight · North America.

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